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Economic and Social Upgrading in Global Value Chains: Insights 
from Philippine Manufacturing Firms1  
Adrian R. Mendoza 
Abstract 
This study explores the 2012 Survey on Adjustments of Establishments to Globalization (SAEG) 
to analyze the economic and social upgrading experience of Philippine manufacturers inside 
global value chains (GVCs). Three broad patterns emerge from the data. First, firms with stronger 
GVC linkages tend to have better labor indicators than purely domestic producers. Second, the 
majority of manufacturers either experienced or missed economic and social upgrading 
simultaneously. Lastly, almost all social upgrading is accompanied by economic upgrading but 
economic upgrading may take place without a social component. Against this background, this 
study uses bivariate probit regression to model the joint determination of the two separate but 
interconnected upgrading outcomes. The estimation results show that the covariates in the model 
can be grouped into three based on their statistical significance—purely economic (i.e., 
employment size, unit labor cost, high skill intensity, and the Kaitz dummy), purely social (i.e., 
training, female intensity and foreign equity), and both (i.e., contractualization and process and 
product innovations). These results have several important implications. First, GVC firms’ notion 
of social upgrading are closer to the softer components of working conditions than to traditional 
measurable indicators such as employment, wages and efficiency. Second, the results suggest 
direct and indirect channels through which technological upgrading may generate desirable social 
outcomes. The direct channel highlights that innovation should be accompanied by skills 
development to sustain higher value creation while the indirect channel underlines the potential of 
innovation to create upward spirals in output, productivity, and ultimately labor conditions. Lastly, 
there are some indications that the social benefits of economic upgrading may not be evenly 
distributed among different types of employment. Overall, the above results emphasize the need 
for a holistic upgrading experience that shifts the country’s comparative advantage from cheap 
labor to innovative local industries and highly-skilled workers.  
Keywords: global value chains, globalization, economic upgrading, social upgrading, labor 
conditions, Philippine manufacturing 
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1. Introduction 
Over the past three decades, manufacturing has been increasingly organized inside global value 
chains (GVCs) where final goods are produced by firms that are geographically scattered but 
virtually connected by technological and trade linkages. This is evident in the rising importance 
of intermediate inputs, semi-processed goods, and auxiliary services in international trade 
transactions (WTO 2014). For instance, Cheng, Seneviratne and Zhang (2015) observe that trade 
in intermediate inputs grew faster than trade in final goods between 1996 and 2013 (i.e., four and 
three times, respectively). The emergence of GVCs as the defining feature of 21st century 
globalization is often viewed by developing countries as a window of opportunity to expand trade 
and improve growth performance. In fact, recent studies suggest that economies that chose to 
integrate into GVCs instead of pursuing domestic-oriented industrialization experienced better 
growth outcomes (IMF 2013; WTO 2014; Cheng, Seneviratne and Zhang 2015). In addition, 
UNCTAD (2013) reports that developing countries with the highest increase in GVC participation 
from 1990 to 2010 also experienced faster GDP per capita growth. One explanation is that the 
easier access to GVCs provided an alternative industrialization route for developing countries 
without having to go through the long and costly process of capital accumulation (as in the cases 
of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan) (Baldwin 2014; WTO 2014). Since the distribution of 
functions is now governed by comparative advantage at the input level, firms can specialize in 
particular production stages instead of developing capabilities to build fully-integrated domestic 
supply chains (Baldwin 2014). In this vein, emerging economies such as the Philippines have 
increased their GVC participation both as lower-tier suppliers in relatively labor-intensive 
manufacturing and hosts of multinational affiliates and foreign subsidiaries. This reflects the 
general increase in the developing world’s GVC participation index from 40.5 in 1995 to 50.9 in 
2009 (WTO 2014). For many newly-industrializing countries, especially in Asia, this is driven by 
a stronger presence in global manufacturing networks. (See Figure 1.) 
Figure 1. GVC Participation Index in Manufacturing, 1995 vs. 2009 
 
   Source: OECD GVC Indicators 2013 
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From the lens of standard trade models, firms are expected to benefit from GVC participation 
through the usual scale and competition effects of foreign operations. In addition, access to 
multinationals’ large network of suppliers opens various opportunities for learning through 
capability building, knowledge transfers, and information spillovers. Indeed, for small 
manufacturers in developing countries, the conventional belief is that GVCs provide greater access 
to key insights about new technologies, product blueprints, consumer preferences, and competitive 
strategies in global markets (Pietrobelli and Rabelloti 2011; Giuliani, De Marchi and Rabellotti 
2017). To the extent that these potential gains actually translate to permanent increase in 
productivity, firms inside global production networks can ultimately take advantage of their 
unique position by upgrading to functions where both value addition and bargaining power are 
higher. However, investments in new skills and knowledge are necessary to build stronger 
capabilities and move up the value ladder (Morrison, Pietrobelli and Rabellotti 2008). This partly 
explains why some producers (e.g., in high-tech sectors in East Asia) have successfully migrated 
from original equipment manufacturing (OEM) to original design and brand manufacturing (ODM 
and OBM) while less innovative suppliers (e.g., in Africa and South America) stagnated in labor-
intensive GVC segments with low value creation (Giuliani, De Marchi and Rabellotti 2017). This 
implies that a country cannot expect to fully capture the long term growth effects of global 
integration by specializing in less sophisticated stages that offer limited innovation and upgrading 
opportunities (Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik, 2007).  
While the upgrading trajectory of firms inside global production networks has been the subject of 
many case studies and macro-level analyses, the social dimension of GVC participation has 
admittedly received lesser attention in the existing literature. (See Amador and Cabral (2016) and 
Giuliani, De Marchi and Rabellotti (2017) for recent surveys.) In particular, only few firm-level 
studies have explored the mechanisms through which innovation and upgrading may ultimately 
improve the welfare and competitiveness of workers in GVC-oriented industries. Yet, this is a 
central issue in many developing countries since their GVC participation relies heavily on their 
comparative advantage in labor-intensive activities. Although the international fragmentation of 
production has become an important source of employment worldwide, the heterogeneous nature 
and quality of jobs inside production networks suggests that the benefits from economic upgrading 
will also be distributed unevenly among workers (Taglioni and Winkler 2014). Most likely, those 
in less skills-intensive and low value-adding activities will only capture a small portion of these 
gains (Nadvi 2004). (See for instance Dedrick, Kraemer and Linden’s (2009) iPod example.) In 
particular, since headquarter firms often keep the most valuable tasks, small-scale upgrading can 
only generate modest effects on workers in firms that perform auxiliary activities.  
Against this background, it is imperative to ask: under what conditions, if any, does economic 
upgrading lead to social improvements? In other words, do workers benefit when their employers 
upgrade? From a macro view, Flanagan and Khor (2012) find cross-country evidence that trade 
openness indirectly improves labor condition through the potential wage effect of higher 
productivity. From a micro perspective, Kummirtz, Taglioni and Winkler (2017) suggest that 
GVCs benefit labor markets through higher demand for skilled workers, additional trainings, and 
knowledge diffusion through turnovers and informal networks. Barrientos, Gereffi and Rossi 
(2011) argue that GVC upgrading can improve labor conditions when they generate quality 
employment that does not only pay decent wages but also protects the rights of workers. Milberg 
and Winkler (2011) also highlight the role of regulation and monitoring in achieving social 
upgrading. Other results from the existing literature suggest that the linkages between economic 
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and social upgrading are rather complex. While a number of studies find that social upgrading 
automatically follows from economic upgrading through higher wages and better labor standards 
(Nadvi 2004; Knorringa and Pegler 2007), other researches show that this causal relationship is 
not automatic. For instance, Fernandez-Stark, Frederick and Gereffi (2011) stress the role of 
regulation, suggesting that outside pressure from governments and international buyers may be 
necessary to force the suppliers in the apparel GVC to provide formal trainings. Milberg and 
Winkler (2011) argue the possibility of a low-road growth path wherein economic upgrading is 
achieved by cutting wages. In a study of the apparel, mobile phones, agro-foods and tourism 
GVCs, Bernhardt and Milberg (2011) conclude that “economic upgrading is often not associated 
with social upgrading, but social upgrading occurs almost always when economic upgrading is 
also observed”. Rossi (2013) also derives similar findings from her study of the Moroccan garment 
industry. In relation to Bernhardt and Milberg (2011), Rossi’s (2013) result implies that while 
economic upgrading provides important prerequisites that can potentially generate desirable social 
outcomes, minimal improvements in firm-level performance cannot create a significant dent on 
labor conditions.  
In the Philippines, studies on the social upgrading of suppliers inside GVCs are rare and 
inconclusive. For instance, Bernhardt and Milberg (2011) observe that while the country has a 
considerable economic upgrading in the mobile telecom sector (i.e., in terms of export market 
share and unit value increase) between 2000 and 2009, there has been an observed decline in 
employment and real wages over the same period (i.e., 35 percent and 69 percent drops, 
respectively). This is in contrast to de Vries et al.’s (2016) macro-level analysis which finds that 
all categories of skilled labor experienced double-digit growth between 2000 and 2011, although 
the majority of manufacturing GVC workers are still low- and medium-skilled. In another study, 
Tejani and Milberg (2010) detect a “defeminization” of manufacturing when there is industrial 
upgrading, although female intensity in the Philippines remained relatively flat between 1985 and 
2007 at around 46 percent.  In addition to the aforementioned studies, some papers also discussed 
the general impacts of globalization on local labor conditions. For instance, Aldaba (2013) finds 
that labor outcomes vary depending on how firms respond to greater trade openness. In particular, 
lower tariffs reduce the wage premium in firms that rely on low value adding processes and low 
skilled workers. On the other hand, the wage premium increased in producers that reallocate 
resources towards skills-intensive exports. However, Lanzona (2000) argues that skills upgrading 
in manufacturing may exacerbate the economy-wide wage inequality when there are no parallel 
technological improvements in agriculture. Looking beyond wages and employment, Sibal, 
Amante and Tolentino (2006) find that micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) generally 
lag behind larger establishments in terms of providing decent work through compliance to local 
and international labor standards. Although data from PSA (2017) show a gradual decline in the 
share of establishments violating labor regulations, from 57.9 percent in 1991 to 47.7 percent in 
2011, the pattern is again on an uptrend through 2016.  However, Sicat (2004a) argues that 
industrial relations and labor costing in the Philippines are actually overregulated, with labor 
violations leading to more restrictive regulations. Ultimately, these interventions helped erode the 
country’s competitive advantage in labor-intensive exports. Sicat (2004b) cites that the major 
success stories in employment and income creation (e.g., export processing zones and business 
process outsourcing) have at least two things in common: first, they involve efforts to reduce the 
negative impact of complicated labor policies on cost and productivity; and second, they involve 
employment of foreign capital. 
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This study adds to the social upgrading literature by analyzing the GVC experience of 
manufacturing firms in the Philippines. In particular, this current research deviates from the usual 
case study approach by applying more formal analyses to the results of the 2012 Survey on 
Adjustments of Establishments to Globalization (SAEG) commissioned by the Escaping the 
Middle Income Trap (EMIT) Research Programme. The SAEG collected data on the 
characteristics, performance indicators, international linkages, and innovative activities of an 
original sample of 450 Philippine establishments. This current research complements the existing 
literature by applying the analytic tools of economic theory and econometrics to establish 
empirical regularities that are hard to detect using the case study approach. In addition, this paper 
contributes to the better understanding of social upgrading through a more systematic 
measurement and evaluation of labor conditions inside GVCs. Lastly, the empirical results are 
analyzed in relation to Philippine labor market developments and the bigger global context. Given 
the country’s erratic growth performance and history of high unemployment (ADB 2007), a 
positive analysis of firm’s upgrading trajectories will hopefully help identify important channels 
through which GVCs may contribute to broad-based industrial development, job creation, and 
income and productivity growth.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 analyzes the relevant SAEG data to 
measure the differences in the labor conditions of firms with and without GVC linkages. Section 
3 formally analyzes the underlying relationship between economic performance and labor 
improvement in the context of GVCs. Finally, Section 4 concludes with a synthesis and some 
policy implications. 
2. A Portrait of GVC Workers in Philippine Manufacturing: Some 
Stylized Facts 
Social upgrading is commonly defined as the process of improving the quality of employment 
through enhanced labor conditions and protection of rights, ultimately leading to the overall well-
being of workers (Barrientos, Gereffi and Rossi 2011). This definition puts a strong emphasis on 
workers as social actors with rights and entitlements instead of factor inputs that simply 
complement capital in the firm’s production function (Sen 2000; Rossi 2013). Social upgrading is 
closely related to the ILO’s notion of decent work which is often quantified in terms of quality of 
employment (e.g., pay, working hours, workplace safety, work-life balance), social protection, 
workers’ rights, and labor relations (Anker et al. 2003; Milberg and Winkler 2011). Barrientos and 
Smith (2007) split social upgrading into two major dimensions. First, measurable standards are 
easily quantifiable indicators of labor conditions such as employment demographics, working 
hours, physical wellbeing, working environment, wage rate, and other employee benefits. Second, 
enabling rights, or what Milberg and Winkler (2011) call informalities, include less quantifiable 
entitlements such as the right to collective bargaining, freedom of association, and 
nondiscrimination, among others. However, Barrientos, Gereffi and Rossi (2011) suggest that the 
two are not mutually exclusive since measurable standards are often the result of properly placed 
enabling rights.  
Guided by the preceding definitions, this section explores relevant SAEG indicators to provide a 
general description of GVC workers in Philippine manufacturing. For comparison, the 
characteristics of the workforce “outside” GVCs are also summarized to test for any statistically 
significant differences across firm categories. Lastly, the survey results are used to analyze the 
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social upgrading experience of GVC firms. At the onset, it should be noted that although almost 
all domestic manufacturers are remotely connected to a GVC, firms that simultaneously export 
and import tend to have the strongest international linkages (Baldwin and Yan 2017). Since cross-
border trade of parts and components is the norm in production networks, it is not surprising for 
suppliers to import intermediate inputs and subsequently export the semi-finished output for 
further processing. Based on this definition, the sampled manufacturers can be grouped according 
to a proposed intensity of GVC operations: Type 1 firms have purely domestic-oriented 
production; Type 2 firms only import while Type 3 firms only export; and Type 4 manufacturers 
have both import and export transactions. This study argues that Type 1 and Type 4 producers 
have the weakest and strongest GVC linkages, respectively, while Types 2 and 3 are moderate 
cases. Note that firms with insufficient information or not in manufacturing are removed from the 
original sample. 
Using the above definition, Table 1 summarizes the conditional distribution of the remaining 326 
manufacturers according to their respective types and broad industrial classifications. Initial 
inspection of the data shows that the majority of firms in the sample have weak GVC connections. 
In particular, 121 manufacturers or 37.12 percent have purely domestic operations while 106 firms 
or 32.32 percent either import or export but not both. Only 99 firms or 30.37 percent are engaged 
in two-way trade. More formally, a simple GVC linkage score is calculated using the following 
formula: 
 =  |
	


 
where  is firm type and |  is the conditional probability of type  in industry . A sector’s GVC 
linkages is tagged as mostly weak when 1 ≤  < 2, mostly moderate when 2 ≤  < 3 and 
mostly strong when  ≥ 3. The results summarized in Table 1 show that in general, GVC 
linkages in many manufacturing sectors in the Philippines are mostly moderate, even in industries 
such as garments and machinery and transport equipment that are extensively organized inside 
global production networks. In textile and apparel, Sicat (2004a) suggests that an “unintended 
alliance” between protective industrial and labor policies was detrimental to the sector’s global 
competitiveness, ultimately losing its potential to generate large exports and employment. In 
particular, the decades of protection enjoyed by the industry through the 1980s proliferated 
manufacturers that were running on outdated technologies, low-skilled labor, and high production 
costs. Efforts to increase the technical capacity of both firms and workers were deemed too little 
too late by the time the WTO took effect. As a result, the liberalization of the domestic textile and 
garments sector starting the 1990s, even at a gradual rate, resulted in the downsizing or ultimate 
closure of some 352 firms between 1998 to 2003 (Antonio and Rodolfo 2006). In automotives, 
Aldaba (2013) notes that the Philippines’ GVC participation is confined in assembly and 
distribution of mostly imported parts. In contrast to these moderate cases, Table 1 identifies two 
extreme industries. In particular, GVC operations seem prevalent in electronics and electrical 
equipment (E&E) with 68.97 percent of the surveyed firms falling in the Type 4 category and 
another 27.58 percent having backward or forward trade linkages. Nevertheless, Aldaba (2015) 
observes that Philippine electronics is dominated by foreign-subsidized manufacturers that 
perform back-end activities (e.g., integrated device manufacturing, semiconductor assembly and 
testing) for their multinational parents. Frederick and Gereffi (2016) also note that Philippine E&E 
exhibits limited presence in design, research and development, sourcing and marketing due to a 
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number of factors such as low investments in innovation and relatively low supply of industry-
specific technicians and engineers needed in new functions, product areas, and end markets. At 
the other extreme, food, beverages and tobacco (FBT) is mostly populated by Filipino-owned 
firms with weak GVC connections. In fact, only 8.82 percent of the sampled firms in the sector 
are involved in two-way trade while 57.35 percent have purely domestic operations. 
In general, the data suggest that a good portion of the country’s GVC participation is driven by 
multinationals partly due to the failure of traditional labor-intensive sectors to upgrade and 
establish a strong international presence. This may be traced back to the post-war decades in which 
intensive protectionism, import substitution policies, and foreign exchange controls led to a 
domestic market largely captured by highly inefficient industries. (See for instance Intal and 
Basilio (1998), Aldaba (2005), and Williamson and de Dios (2014) for more extensive historical 
accounting). The minimal competitive pressures and knowledge spillovers from abroad did not 
provide the necessary stimulus to force the government and the private sector to invest in human 
capital development and technological innovation. Consequently, Philippine manufacturers 
entered the second wave of globalization in the 1970s with relatively weak capabilities to secure 
their shares in local markets and capture high value-adding functions in expanding American and 
Japanese production networks. As indicated by Table 1, this trend would persist through the 1990s 
and 2000s, with domestic industries becoming specialized in the production of traditional goods 
or in labor-intensive segments of high-tech value chains. Nevertheless, a more optimistic take on 
these historical trends is that Philippine manufacturing may still have many untapped upgrading 
opportunities inside GVCs. However, harnessing these gains would require large-scale and 
purposeful efforts to adapt and innovate given the fast increasing complexity of global 
manufacturing. 
Table 1. Conditional Distribution of Manufacturers by Industry, 2011 
Industry 
No. of 
Firms 
Conditional Distribution  GVC  
Linkages Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4 
Food, Beverages and Tobacco 68 57.35  16.18  17.65   8.82 Mostly Weak 
Textile, Apparel and Leather 45 44.44  11.11  17.78  26.67  Mostly Moderate 
Wood and Furniture 31 25.81    9.68  32.26  32.26  Mostly Moderate 
Paper Products 10 50.00  20.00  -    30.00  Mostly Moderate 
Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals 27 37.04  40.74  -    22.22  Mostly Moderate 
Rubber and Plastics 27 44.44  22.22    3.70  29.63  Mostly Moderate 
Metals and Minerals 55 34.55  21.82    5.45  38.18  Mostly Moderate 
Electronic and Electrical Eqpt. 29   3.45 10.34  17.24  68.97 Mostly Strong 
Machinery and Transport Eqpt. 23 30.43  30.43  17.39  21.74  Mostly Moderate 
Others* 11 -   9.09  18.18  72.73  Mostly Strong 
All Sectors 326 37.12  18.71  13.80  30.37  Mostly Moderate 
 Source: SAEG 2012 
*Includes seven manufacturers of jewelry, fashion, and sporting goods which fall either in the Type 3 or 
Type 4 categories; hence, the mostly strong GVC linkages. 
Table 2 describes the major characteristics of the workers in different firm categories. Note that 
median values for the indicators are used to reduce the distortions from extreme observations. 
Using Type 1 firms as the reference group, Pearson’s test for equality of medians was implemented 
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to formally check whether manufacturers with foreign linkages are significantly different from 
firms with domestic operations only. In general, the variables summarized below suggest that 
workers in firms with international transactions tend to enjoy better labor conditions compared to 
employees of purely domestic producers. Further, the median tests for Type 4 firms are statistically 
significant in almost all indicators, suggesting that they are the most distinct category from Type 
1 manufacturers. This also confirms the earlier proposition that the two groups broadly correspond 
to the least and most extreme cases of GVC participation, respectively. 
Table 2. Median Labor Indicators, 2011 
Indicator Unit Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4 
Employment Persons 39.50 72.00*** 101.00*** 152.50*** 
   (11.21) (11.94) (42.40) 
Wages ‘000 Pesos/Person 59.57 102.01*** 79.95** 121.93*** 
   (11.19) (5.36) (42.40) 
Kaitz Index Ratio 0.95 0.45*** 0.59* 0.41*** 
   (12.63) (3.50) (35.62) 
Social Security Benefits ‘000 Pesos/Person 4.88 7.86*** 5.58 7.76*** 
   (17.48) (0.50) (24.40) 
Production Workers Share 85.30 73.85** 80.42 76.77* 
   (6.30) (0.68) (3.61) 
Female Workers Share 28.87 22.22 38.23 42.08** 
   (1.85) (1.98) (6.57) 
Labor Productivity ‘000 Pesos 51.84 116.77*** 82.29** 163.78*** 
   (15.41) (5.15) (43.35) 
Unit Labor Cost Pesos 0.25 0.14** 0.28 0.16** 
   (5.29) (0.05) (3.87) 
Low-skilled Turnover Share 10.00 5.00 10.00 6.00 
   (1.40) (0.00) (0.03) 
High-skilled Turnover Share 5.00 5.00 5.00 2.00** 
   (0.50) (0.73) (3.86) 
Source: SAEG 2012  
Notes:  
Amounts are expressed in constant 2000 prices using a manufacturing-specific deflator.   Numbers in 
parentheses are Pearson chi-squared statistics for the nonparametric test of equality of medians. 
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.001 
Looking at individual indicators, Table 2 shows that all firm types with imports and/or exports 
generate more employment than Type 1 manufacturers. This is not surprising since access to 
foreign markets, especially to the large consumer base of multinational-led GVCs, produce a well-
known scale effect on the firms’ production. In addition, manufacturers with international 
transactions tend to pay significantly higher wages to their employees. In particular, the median 
wage of two-way traders is twice as large as the median compensation in domestic-oriented firms. 
The reversed pattern is observed for the Kaitz index or the ratio of production workers to total 
employment multiplied by the ratio of legal minimum wage (LMW) to average daily wage. 
Intuitively, firms with low Kaitz values tend to employ more skilled labor who are paid higher 
than the minimum. Consistent with the above results, this implies that large GVC suppliers are 
expected to be less sensitive to upward adjustments in the LMW. In contrast, the “bite” of a 
minimum wage increase will be felt more by smaller domestic-oriented producers. On the other 
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hand, the median social security and health contributions by Types 2 and 4 manufacturers are also 
significantly higher than what Type 1 firms normally provide. One possible explanation suggested 
by Lipsey and Sjoholm (2004) is that globally-oriented firms offer better wages and benefits to 
keep their highly-trained workers and attract new good ones. Accordingly, employees of 
manufacturers in the exporting and/or importing businesses seem more productive. Most notably, 
the median labor productivity (i.e., value added per employee) of Type 4 traders is thrice as large 
as that of Type 1 firms. In other words, a unit of labor in the former produces much higher value 
added than a unit of labor in the latter. Consequently, the median unit labor costs (ULCs) of Types 
2 and 4 manufacturers are significantly lower compared to Type 1 firms, suggesting that the 
effective wage spending requirement to create a unit of output is significantly higher for purely-
domestic producers. In short, Type 1 firms are less efficient. Lastly, the lower share of production 
workers in firms with trade transactions imply a higher portion of the workforce involved in 
managerial and research and development (R&D) positions. However, R&D workers in Philippine 
GVC firms are still low by international standards, suggesting that the country is still specialized 
in relatively low-skilled intensive GVC functions. In terms of achieving gender-neutral 
manufacturing, only Type 4 firms seem to be making a significant progress in closing the gap, 
with a median female share in total employment of nearly one-half. This echoes Farole’s (2016) 
conclusion that GVCs have more inclusive employment demographics. This is also consistent with 
Flanagan and Khor’s (2012) finding that export processing zones have a high proportion of female 
workers. Finally, the results find no significant differences in the turnover of low-skilled workers 
while the attrition of high-skilled labor is significantly lower in Type 4 firms, possibly due to the 
apparent better employment conditions. Kummirtz, Taglioni and Winkler (2017) note that firms 
normally keep high-skilled workers in order to recover their investments in trainings and minimize 
the leakage of internal knowledge to their competitors. 
In order to formally measure the social premium of GVC participation, this study adopts the 
approach of Bernard and Jensen (1999) and Kasahara and Lapham (2013) by estimating the 
following regression equation for each variable in Table 2: 
ln  =  + (1 − ) +  (1 − ) + ! + "#$ + % 
where  is a particular attribute of firm &;  and   are dummy variables equal to 1 when firm & 
import or export, respectively; " is a vector of control variables such as size, industry and 
location, $ is the vector of parameters corresponding to ", and %  is the stochastic error term. The 
parameters ,  , and ! measure the respective social premia of Types 2, 3, and 4 firms over 
Type 1 manufacturers.  The signs, magnitudes and statistical significance of the estimated 
economic and social premia in Table 3 are broadly consistent with Table 2. Most notably, Type 4 
firms, where “purely” GVC transactions most probably take place, generate relatively bigger 
social gains compared to the other groups. Labor productivity produces the largest premium at 
1.37; i.e., the workforce in Type 4 firms are, on the average, 137 percent more productive than in 
Type 1 manufacturers. Large differentials are also found in ULCs, wages, Kaitz index, and social 
security benefits. 
In general, the picture depicted by the above results is one where better working environment is 
more common in firms with stronger GVC linkages. This is consistent with some macro-level 
evidence showing that trade openness indirectly contributes to better labor conditions (Flanagan 
and Khor 2012).  However, whether this is merely coincidental with or a direct effect of GVC 
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participation is not clear at this point since no causal relationships can be established from the 
contemporaneous nature of the regressions. Succeeding discussions will explore how positive 
economic performance may reinforce social upgrading or how good labor conditions may 
contribute to labor productivity, and ultimately to economic upgrading. On the one hand, entry 
into value chains may lead to expanded production and more employment opportunities. In 
addition, since large multinationals adhere to strict product and labor standards to protect the 
quality and integrity of their brands, non-compliant local suppliers may be sanctioned to observe 
labor laws and provide trainings not only to improve competitiveness but also to maintain 
goodwill. This is especially true for reputation-sensitive firms that operate in sectors where 
government and special-advocacy groups push for stricter implementation of labor codes and 
human rights (OECD 2013). In addition, large firms are more integrated into the formal economy; 
hence, legally-constrained to strictly observe labor regulations. Further, the so-called learning 
effects of importing and exporting may also produce positive spillovers on labor productivity 
through access to better technologies from abroad (Greenaway and Kneller 2007; Kiriyama 2012). 
Table 3. Estimated Premium of GVC Participation, 2011 
Dependent Variable ' '  '! 
Wages 0.48*** 0.43*** 0.72*** 
 (0.15) (0.16) (0.13) 
Social Security Benefits 0.49*** 0.15 0.69*** 
 (0.15) (0.20) (0.15) 
Kaitz Index -0.69*** -0.54*** -0.77*** 
 (0.18) (0.20) (0.15) 
Share of Production Workers -0.14*** -0.07 -0.07** 
 (0.04)  (0.04) (0.03) 
Share of Female Workers -0.04 0.06* 0.08** 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) 
Labor Productivity 0.86*** 0.96*** 1.43*** 
 (0.20) (0.22) (0.18) 
Unit Labor Cost -0.49*** -0.55** -0.73*** 
 (0.17) (0.22) (.018) 
Low-skilled Turnover -0.04 -0.04 -0.07* 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) 
High-skilled Turnover -0.03 -0.07* -0.06 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
                  Source: Author’s calculations using the SAEG 2012  
                  Notes:  
                  Only monetary variables are expressed in natural logarithms.  
      Controls include employment size (in natural logarithm), industry, and region.  
                  Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. 
                  *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.001 
On the other hand, the more empirically supported view in the literature is that better firms self-
select into foreign markets. In the presence of huge entry costs accruing from foreign operations, 
only sufficiently large and efficient manufacturers will be able to participate in global markets 
(Bernard and Jensen 1999; Melitz 2003). In other words, firms that are internationalized are 
already outstanding before they started exporting or importing. In the context of GVCs, 
participation of aspiring suppliers is often constrained by requirements to adopt industry best 
  
 
11 
 
practices in terms of process and product quality standards as well as labor relations and 
environmental responsibility. This implies that forming a productive workforce may be part of 
firms’ “dressing up” for foreign markets. Therefore, when fostering acceptable labor conditions 
requires non-trivial costs, the self-selection view suggests that the social premium observed in 
firms inside production networks cannot be entirely attributed to their post-GVC entry. In other 
words, the manufacturers most capable of social upgrading are also the ones more likely to join 
GVCs on account of their above-average capabilities. Since they are larger, more profitable, and 
more established, they are also in a better financial position to provide for the well-being of their 
employees. An interesting implication of this view is that economic and social upgrading will most 
likely co-exist.  
In addition to the measurable standards of social upgrading analyzed above, the SAEG also 
contains information related to the softer components of labor conditions. Table 4 reports the share 
of firms that practice contractualization, have recognized labor unions, and provide regular 
trainings. Tests of proportions are also performed to identify any statistically significant 
differences between firm types. The results suggest that firms actually practice labor policies that 
may produce mixed social outcomes. For instance, the share of firms with organized unions is 
twice as high in Types 2 and 4 than in Type 1. However, despite the legally-guaranteed freedom 
of association and rights to collective bargaining, the actual union membership across firm types 
are generally low. Serrano (2016) reports that union density declined from 30.5 percent in 1995 to 
8.5 percent in 2012 In the SAEG sample, the average unionization rate in Types 2 to 4 
manufactures is only 8.29 percent. One possibility is that the stricter implementation of 
government regulations diminishes the role of unions in bargaining for better labor conditions. 
However, Sicat (2004a) suggests that the prevalence of “standardized” government intervention 
in firm-specific labor issues such as compensation, benefits, and tenure undermines the potential 
of management-union negotiations in achieving more efficient outcomes. Another possible reason 
for low unionization is the presence of employee associations, labor management committees, and 
cooperatives that provide alternatives venues for social dialogue and consultation (Sibal, Amante 
and Tolentino 2006).  In addition, an ADB (2013) study partially traced the low unionization rate 
to the significant share of small and informal-sector employers where trade unions may be 
unnecessary and the widespread practice of hiring precarious (i.e., short-term, seasonal, casual, 
and probationary) employees that are not qualified to join unions. Incidentally, a higher fraction 
of Types 2 and 4 firms employ contractual labor. In the entire manufacturing sector, PSA (2017) 
reports that around 30 percent of total employment in 2012 are non-regular workers. While this 
may be consistent with the firm’s profit maximizing objective, widespread contractualization is 
often criticized by special-advocacy groups due to the perceived negative effect on workers’ 
welfare, particularly in terms of differential access to social security benefits. Nadvi (2004) also 
argues that contract employment is vulnerable to adverse demand and supply shocks. 
Nevertheless, there can be circumstances when contractualization is not completely inconsistent 
with social upgrading. For instance, flexibility in employing contractual labor in some aspects of 
operation may improve the firm’s cost efficiency, competitiveness, and profitability which may 
ultimately generate higher production and more demand for skilled labor. On the other hand, 
Suresh (2010) suggests the possibility of a segmented social upgrading wherein permanent 
workers consistently enjoy good labor conditions “while irregular employees’ “buffering” role in 
manufacturing do not allow them to benefit as much since they can be “hired in peaks and fired in 
slumps”.  
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Table 4. Some Indicators of Labor Relations, 2011 
Share of firms with: Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4 
Recognized Trade Union 7.38 16.95** 9.09 14.29** 
  (-1.97) (-0.36) (1.66) 
Contractualization 21.31 36.07** 20.00 33.33** 
  (-2.14) (0.18) (2.01) 
Regular Trainings  44.92 70.00*** 61.36** 72.16*** 
  (-3.17) (-1.86) (-4.02) 
              Source: Author’s calculations using the SAEG 2012  
              Notes:  
              Numbers in parentheses are ( statistics. 
              *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.001 
In terms of trainings, data from the SAEG suggests that the proportions of Types 2 to 4 firms that 
support regular skills upgrading are significantly higher than Type 1 manufacturers. This may not 
be surprising since competitive pressures and constantly evolving tastes and technology in global 
markets force GVC-oriented producers to continuously update their own competencies and 
consequently, the quality of their workforce. Yet, trainings enhance not only the workers’ 
contribution to the production process but also their role as productive social actors (Barrientos, 
Gereffi and Rossi 2011). This highlights the dual nature of skills development as an intersection 
of economic and social upgrading. On the one hand, strict process and product specifications in 
GVCs rationalize the need for regular training programs. When assimilated properly, this ensures 
that workers will be able to perform their functions with minimal error. On the other hand, the 
accumulation of skills may support an upward spiral of better tasks, healthier working 
environment, higher-paying positions, and even more skills. In addition, trainings may also result 
in industry-wide spillovers when labor is sufficiently mobile across manufacturers and skills are 
not very firm-specific. 
Table 5. Joint Distribution of Economic and Social Upgrading among Types 2 to 4 
Manufacturers 
Economic 
Upgrading 
Social Upgrading 
No Yes Total 
No 31.39   4.04 35.43 
Yes 24.66 39.91 64.57 
Total 56.05 43.95 100.00 
Pearson’s ) : 52.632*** 
Goodman & Kruskal's *: 0.853*** 
               Source: Author’s calculations using the SAEG 2012 
                                                   *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.001 
Finally, Table 5 summarizes the joint distribution of 223 firms of Types 2 to 4 based on self-
reported economic and social upgrading. Type 1 manufacturers are excluded from the analysis to 
better capture the producers with actual GVC transactions. The data suggest that the majority of 
manufacturers with potential GVC linkages believe to have experienced (or missed) economic and 
social upgrading simultaneously. In particular, 31.39 percent of the surveyed firms do not report 
any upgrading while another 39.91 percent perceive improvements in both economic and social 
aspects (i.e., the high-road path). Although this may be subject to reporting bias since the SAEG 
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question captures what firms think rather than what employees experience, the pattern is broadly 
consistent with the preceding analyses showing a strong correlation between the two forms of 
upgrading. However, nearly a quarter of manufacturers in the sample undergo economic upgrading 
without social improvements (i.e., the low-road path). Table 5 also supports Bernhardt and 
Milberg’s (2011) findings that social upgrading without economic gains is very rare. In fact, the 
data shows that almost all social upgrading is accompanied by economic upgrading but economic 
upgrading may take place without a social component. Two interesting questions arise from the 
preceding observations. First, what mechanism connects the two forms of upgrading? That is, what 
factors can potentially explain the joint distribution in Table 5? Second, what distinguishes firms 
in the high-road and low-road upgrading paths? The next section attempts to answer these 
questions by exploring the underlying relationship between economic performance and labor 
improvement in the context of GVCs.  
3. The Link Between Economic and Social Upgrading  
The idea that economic and social upgrading are not necessarily competing corporate objectives 
is consistent with recent initiatives to refocus business practices from purely profit-driven 
activities to socially-inclusive entrepreneurship. For instance, Poblador (2017) argues that the so-
called inclusive business models should be integrated into firms’ strategic agenda because of their 
potential contribution to long-term viability. In this framework, communities, especially their 
poorest members, are seen as important business partners whose sustainability has a direct impact 
on firms’ operations. In particular, when the host communities are a non-trivial source of labor 
and raw materials, it will always be in the strategic interest of business to participate in 
community-building efforts by providing training and skills development, technical assistance, 
and access to financing (Poblador 2017). In other words, firms are essentially investing in their 
future growth by nurturing a stable and mutually-beneficial relationship with its potential 
employees, suppliers, and customers. However, given that socially-inclusive business often 
requires huge financial resources, organizational capital, and extensive networking, the challenge 
for firms is how to align the interests of stakeholders without compromising financial 
sustainability. 
In general, a successful economic upgrading depends on a firm’s ability to generate higher value 
added by implementing faster and more effective innovations than its competitors. Using the 
typology proposed by Kaplinsky and Morris (2001) and Humphrey and Schmitz (2002), this study 
defines economic upgrading as having successfully implemented either process, product or 
functional upgrading. First, process upgrading is the increase in efficiency following the adoption 
of new production techniques. Second, product upgrading creates higher value added by 
introducing new products or improving existing ones. Lastly, functional upgrading results from 
the firm’s (upward) movement to more sophisticated tasks inside the value chain (e.g., from OEM 
to ODM and OBM). Higher forms of upgrading are excluded in this study since they are generally 
unobserved in the sample.  Table 6 summarizes the share, per type, of firms that reported to have 
undergone economic upgrading. The data suggest that a large proportion of firms with potential 
GVC connections didn’t experience any economic upgrading. This figure is highest for Type 2 
manufacturers at 51.11 percent. On the other hand, process upgrading is the most common form 
of upgrading achieved by firms. This may be partially traced to the fact that introducing new 
production technology is relatively faster and cheaper than launching new products or migrating 
to entirely new value chain functions. While higher forms of upgrading usually require intensive 
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innovation projects, more efficient processes can easily result from the purchase of new machines 
or simple ergonomic changes in factories (Rossi 2013). Overall, 12.56 percent of GVC traders 
benefitted from better production efficiency due to pure process improvements while an additional 
36.32 percent combined process upgrading with product or functional upgrading or both. Another 
interesting pattern suggested by Table 6 is that many firms seem to have achieved higher value 
creation as a result of simultaneous efforts to pursue strategies that require all forms of upgrading. 
This is highly likely in a scenario where a shift to more complicated functions requires capabilities 
to supply more sophisticated inputs and integrate new technologies into the existing production 
process.  
Table 6. Forms of Economic Upgrading among Types 2 to 4 Manufacturers 
Upgrading Types 1-3 Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 
None 35.43 27.87 51.11 29.29 
Process only 12.56 19.67 6.67 12.12 
Product only 7.17 6.56 4.44 10.1 
Functional only 4.93 9.84 4.44 8.08 
Process + Product 8.07 6.56 8.89 7.07 
Process + Functional 6.73 4.92 2.22 8.08 
Product + Functional 3.59 24.59 4.44 3.03 
All 21.52 27.87 17.78 22.22 
                         Source: Author’s calculations using the SAEG 2012 
According to Barrientos, Gereffi and Rossi (2011), each form of economic upgrading embodies a 
capital dimension (i.e., new technology) and a labor dimension (i.e., skills development). 
Therefore, when improvements in the quality of workers are necessary to achieve better firm 
performance, we can generally expect social and economic upgrading to intertwine. This means 
that moving up (or down) the value ladder will have a direct consequence on labor conditions. For 
instance, adopting labor-enhancing technologies may increase the firm’s overall productivity (i.e., 
output per worker) while at the same time reducing errors, accidents, health hazards, and overtimes 
(Rossi 2013). In addition, both firms and workers gain from product and functional upgrading 
when creating more value requires more complex skills and scaled up operations. In some 
instances, forward looking manufacturers preparing to upgrade would offer better compensation 
packages in order to attract high skilled workers. However, one possible caveat is that economic 
upgrading may benefit employees differently depending on their relative contributions to the 
production process. Likewise, there are growing concerns that more advanced innovations may 
trivialize the role of labor in different industries. 
In standard economic analysis, the relationship between economic and social upgrading can be 
depicted as a strong positive relationship between wage and productivity growth (Milberg and 
Winkler 2011). This means that higher efficiency and value creation due to technology upgrading 
and skills development should be accompanied by a proportional increase in the value of labor, 
other things equal. In short, better firm performance should lead to better labor outcomes. On a 
macro level, this means that sustained growth is expected to create more jobs, decrease 
unemployment, increase productivity, and raise living standards. As illustrated in Figure 1, labor 
productivity and real wage (both in natural logarithmic scale) show a strong positive correlation 
across firm types. That is, more productive workers also receive higher wages. However, a 
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common criticism about this narrow view is that wage growth may not adequately capture the 
social dimension of labor conditions. In particular, aggregate productivity growth will benefit 
workers differently depending on their role in the production process. This is especially relevant 
in GVCs where efforts to strike a balance between quality and competitiveness force firms to focus 
on their core competencies, possibly leading to wage cuts or temporary loss of jobs for non-core 
employees (Barrientos, Gereffi and Rossi 2011). In this case, social protection, enabling rights and 
regulatory constraints may be necessary to preserve the overall well-being of workers.  
Figure 2. Scatterplots of Real Wage and Labor Productivity across Firm Types 
 
    Source: Author’s calculations using the SAEG 2012 
In light of the foregoing discussion, the rest of this section formally analyzes the mechanism 
connecting economic and social upgrading in GVCs, with the assumption that the two outcomes 
are the result of separate but correlated decision making processes. This is not an unreasonable 
assumption based on the chi-squared test of Table 5 which does not support the hypothesis that 
the two forms of upgrading are independent. In fact, the estimated gamma statistic is very high at 
0.853, suggesting a very strong tendency to observe economic and social upgrading 
simultaneously. The preceding survey of existing evidence also points to a close relationship 
between the two upgrading outcomes. According to Greene (2012), failure to account for this 
correlation is a potential source of bias. Against this background, the following two-equation 
bivariate probit regression model is used to jointly estimate the latent variables underlying the two 
forms of upgrading: 
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+, = -. + /
#0. + "#1. + 2.
3 = -4 + /#04 + "#14 + 24  
where , is a binary variable equal to 1 if a particular firm & reported to have experienced process, 
product, or functional upgrading; and 3 is a binary variable equal to 1 if a firm claimed to have 
enhanced both the quality of work and the capabilities of its workers; /  is a vector of the 
hypothesized activities that contribute to the upgrading process, "  is  a vector of industry and 
regional controls; the -’s, 5’s and *’s are model parameters; and the 2’s are error terms assumed 
to be bivariate standard normal with correlation 6. Note that the above specification uses the same 
set of explanatory variables to model the respective latent variables underlying ,  and 3 . For 
vector / , the hypothesized firm-level attributes associated with upgrading include internal 
capabilities, labor conditions, and external linkages. First, larger, more efficient, and more 
innovative manufacturers are also more likely to capture sophisticated tasks that require better 
skills and generate higher value added. Second, foreign exposure, especially through GVC 
participation, may lead to economic and social upgrading through competitive pressures, 
knowledge spillovers, or simply, participation requirements that prescribe specific standards (e.g., 
process and product specification, and labor and environment regulations). Lastly, fostering 
healthy working conditions through skill upgrading and enabling rights may create a stimulating 
environment where labor is both productive and dignified.  
The econometric results for the joint determination of economic and social upgrading are 
summarized in Table 7. However, caution must be exercised when ascribing causal effects from 
the explanatory into the dependent variables due to the contemporaneous specification of the 
model. At the onset, it is worth highlighting that the model performed fairly well in fitting the 
data, with the average predicted probabilities close to the actual joint distribution in Table 5. The 
goodness-of-fit test based on Murphy (2007) also failed to invalidate the assumption that 2.  and 24  are bivariate normal. In addition, the model’s estimated partial correlation 67 is significantly 
different from zero; in fact, it is very high at 0.82. These provide justifications for the use of 
bivariate probit regression to jointly model the two upgrading outcomes. However, since the 
dependent variables used are based on firms’ subjective self-evaluation, part of the close 
association may be explained by difficulties in properly attributing internal changes to better 
economic performance on the one hand and improved labor conditions on the other. Nevertheless, 
this result is still broadly consistent with the narrow view that economic (i.e., productivity growth) 
and social (i.e., wage growth) upgrading are interconnected. 
The initial expectation is that the two dimensions of upgrading will be linked to a similar set of 
factors given their high correlation. However, the resulting pattern suggests that the explanatory 
variables can be grouped into three based on their statistical significance; i.e., purely economic, 
purely social, and both. In particular, employment size, ULC, high skill intensity, and the Kaitz 
dummy are significantly associated to economic upgrading only. On the other hand, training, 
female intensity and foreign equity share are statistically relevant to social upgrading only. Lastly, 
contractualization and process and product innovations are significant in both dimensions. 
Notwithstanding the subjective definition of the dependent variables, the estimates reveal that 
manufacturers’ view of economic and social upgrading are broadly consistent with more objective 
indicators; that is, the former is mostly associated with better internal capabilities while the latter 
is identified with the softer components of working conditions. Interestingly, this tells us that 
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firms’ notion of social upgrading goes beyond the traditional labor indicators such as employment, 
wages and efficiency. 
Table 7. Bivariate Probit Model for the Joint Determination of Economic and Social 
Upgrading of Types 2 to 4 Manufacturers 
 
Dependent Variable Economic Upgrading Social Upgrading 
Employment Size (ln) 0.21** 0.03 
  (0.09) (0.09) 
Unit labor cost -1.21** 0.17 
 (0.45) (0.32) 
Kaitz Index ≥ 1 (Dummy) -0.65** 0.32 
 (0.28) (0.29) 
High Skilled Labor (Dummy) 0.61** 0.06 
 (0.26) (0.23) 
No. of Process Innovations 0.73*** 1.08*** 
 (0.20) (0.22) 
No. of Product Innovations 1.00*** 0.37** 
 (0.23) (0.18) 
Contractualization (Dummy) 0.65** 1.15*** 
 (0.29) (0.30) 
Union (Dummy)  -0.08 0.20 
 (0.35) (0.31) 
Regular Training (Dummy) -0.07 0.64** 
 (0.25) (0.26) 
Share of Female Workers 0.15 -1.37*** 
 (0.53) (0.50) 
Foreign Equity Share -0.04 0.61** 
 (0.29) (0.29) 
Intercept -1.19** -2.09*** 
 (0.54) (0.62) 
Industry Control Yes Yes 
Region Control Yes Yes 
n 209  
Wald )  159.67  
67 0.82***  
 (0.07)  
Model fit:   
Murphy’s )    8.90  
8(,9:;:<&9 = 0, 3:9&?@ = 0) 33.22  
8(,9:;:<&9 = 0, 3:9&?@ = 1)   4.18  
8(,9:;:<&9 = 1, 3:9&?@ = 0) 23.55  
8(,9:;:<&9 = 1, 3:9&?@ = 1) 39.05  
        Source: Author’s calculations using the SAEG 2012  
        Notes:  
        Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. 
        *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.001 
Let us now look at the individual covariates that are significantly associated with the upgrading 
process. In general, the results for purely economic factors are consistent with what self-selection 
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predicts; that is, larger, more efficient (i.e., lower ULC) and more high-skilled intensive firms are 
intuitively better able to pursue activities that support economic upgrading. On the other hand, the 
negative coefficient of the Kaitz dummy provide some evidence that LMW may be more 
detrimental to small than large manufacturers. Understandably, bigger and high-skilled intensive 
firms tend to employ more productive workers that command wages way above the legally-set 
rate. On the other hand, Lanzona (2014) argues that smaller enterprises, especially those in low-
skilled and low-wage sectors, are more vulnerable to the adverse employment effect of higher 
LMW. These results point to a possibly regressive wage setting policy that constrains both the 
financial viability of small manufacturers and their ability to create jobs for low-skilled labor. 
Therefore, raising the minimum wage can actually be welfare-reducing to the labor segments that 
minimum wage laws intend to protect (Paqueo, Orbeta and Lanzona 2016). For instance, World 
Bank (2013) estimates a -0.82 percent elasticity of formal manufacturing employment to minimum 
wage in the Philippines. World Bank also cites that firms in the garments sector, whose total 
employment decreased by at least 50 percent over the last two decades, identify high minimum 
wages, in addition to technological backwardness, as a major contributor to the decline of the 
industry.  
The results for purely social factors also merit further elaboration. In particular, the negative 
contribution of a more “feminine” workforce is inconsistent with government and industry policies 
that aim to achieve gender-inclusive labor outcomes by promoting nondiscriminatory access to 
employment. According to World Bank (2012), removing gender barriers is “smart economics” 
since it does not only generate broad productivity gains but also enhances the role of women in 
household and social decision-making. However, although globalization has open job 
opportunities for women, Milberg and Winkler (2011) observe that many female workers are still 
hired as irregular employees that perform low value adding tasks and earns low wages. In the 
Philippines, ADB (2013) cites a similar trend of rising precarious female employment in export 
processing zones. This mirrors general Philippine labor market indicators showing that women 
are more common in vulnerable, low-skilled, and low-wage employment (ADB 2013). Therefore, 
simply increasing the share of women in total employment without providing fairer access to 
human capital development, quality jobs, and social protection may not generate an inclusive 
social upgrading. 
On the other hand, foreign ownership has a positive and significant contribution to social 
upgrading only. In light of previous discussions pointing to moderate GVC linkages in many low-
skilled sectors, this result suggests that stronger foreign participation in domestic-oriented sectors 
may generate positive labor outcomes either by creating more employment or offering a social 
premium.  In fact, Sibal, Amante and Tolentino (2006) also documented that the proportion of 
non-agricultural establishments that provided non-monetary benefits in 2004 (e.g., work and 
family programs, parental and sick leaves, and reproductive health programs) is higher among 
firms with foreign equity than among Filipino-owned businesses. In addition, the majority of 
employers in their study, especially foreign-owned, claimed to have a good or very good labor-
management relations. One argument is that foreign-owned or subsidized firms have to compete 
with local employers for high-quality workers. Another possible explanation is that suppliers with 
international connections, especially with big multinationals, are more likely to follow labor 
regulations due to reputational reasons. Despite the generally weak evidence in support of “anti-
sweatshop” campaigns (Brown, Deardorff and Stern 2004), many GVCs still responded to the 
growing pressure against global brands with unacceptable labor practices (e.g., forced labor and 
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hazardous jobs) by implementing stricter internal codes of conduct in the workplace (OECD, 
2013). Private-led and multilateral efforts such as the Fairtrade movement, the Social 
Accountability 8000 certification, the ILO’s MNE Declaration and the European Union’s 
Generalized Scheme of Preference (GSP+) have also contributed to the mainstreaming of 
international enterprises in global movements for social progress.  
The dual role of contractualization underlines a seeming paradox. How can employing irregular 
labor contribute to both economic and social upgrading? On the one hand, globally-fragmented 
production is premised on the efficiency effects of outsourcing non-core activities to low-cost 
suppliers. As part of their competitive strategy, suppliers would normally employ contractual labor 
to further reduce production costs. By outsourcing non-core functions, this may improve economic 
performance as long as the firm’s overall productivity is not compromised. Yet, the acceptability 
of this labor practice is a perennial issue in academic and policy debates. According to Barrientos, 
Gereffi and Rossi (2011), the negative connotation attached to contractualization may be traced to 
the stark contrast between the labor conditions of regular and irregular workers. In particular, 
irregular workers are more vulnerable to demand and technological shocks due to the low-skilled 
nature of their employment. In addition, their temporary status often prevents contractuals from 
enjoying the same rights and benefits as permanent employees. Against this background, the 
empirical paradox above tells something about the quality of upgrading among GVC firms; that 
is, the social benefits of contractualization may not be evenly distributed between regular and 
contractual employees. Nevertheless, the fact that efficiency gains allow firms to provide jobs to 
otherwise unemployed labor shows a particular instance where contractualization can benefit both 
firms and workers. Sicat (2004a) also suggests that contractualization may actually be a symptom 
of the overregulation in Philippine labor markets, with cost-minimizing firms naturally exploring 
possibilities to reduce the legal rigidities of hiring (and terminating) regular workers. World 
Bank’s (2013) also finds that restrictive labor regulations appear to be a greater obstacle among 
foreign-owned or subsidized firms, especially MSMEs, than among Filipino-owned 
establishments. In this light, Sicat (2004a) suggests that instead of maintaining “pro-employed” 
programs, the government should promote “pro-employment” policies where labor standards do 
not distort the allocation of skills across industries and where firms have enough flexibility to 
pursue upgrading activities that enhance productivity and generate employment. 
Finally, the econometric results also highlight the dual role of process and product innovations as 
factors relevant to both economic and social upgrading. As with size, efficiency and high-skill 
intensity, the positive contribution of innovation to economic upgrading is intuitive. In fact, this 
is an explicit expression of Kaplinsky and Morris’s (2001) definition; that is, economic upgrading 
is the result of innovation. In the context of GVC operations, the mechanism is pretty 
straightforward: firms should expectedly generate more value from new technologies that improve 
the efficiency of production or new products that embody better quality standards and more 
sophisticated skills. In terms of social impact, the results do not support the conventional 
pessimism about innovation making labor redundant or obsolete in the workplace. In fact, the dual 
role of innovation reveals two major channels through which technological development may 
influence labor conditions. The direct channel suggests that process and product innovation should 
be accompanied by productivity improvements in order to generate and sustain positive economic 
results. For example, the pursuit of functional upgrading may urge firms to increase benefits and 
regularly provide trainings in order to retain high-skilled workers. The indirect channel suggests 
that better performance accruing from innovation may lead to upward spirals in output and 
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productivity, and ultimately better labor outcomes (e.g., higher employment, better wages, and a 
safer and more efficient workplace). 
The results also suggest that firms in the low-road and high-road upgrading paths are mainly 
distinguished by their innovative activities, with product and process improvements being more 
prevalent in the latter. Interestingly, the majority (i.e., 61.11 percent) of upgraders on the low road 
are mainly Filipino-owned producers in low-tech and labor intensive sectors such as FBT, 
garments, wood and furniture, and paper products. In contrast, 61.36 percent of firms on the high 
road are majority foreign-owned manufacturers in medium- to high-tech and relatively capital 
intensive industries like chemicals and pharmaceuticals, plastics, metals and minerals, electronics, 
and automotives. In addition, the data shows that it is more common for high-road firms to provide 
regular trainings to their employees. This is in line with Kaplinsky and Morris’s (2001) argument 
that the key difference between producers in the two upgrading trajectories is actually the 
capability (i.e., technology and skills) to implement and sustain process and product 
improvements. Accordingly, it is not unreasonable to expect a long run divergence in the two 
groups’ growth patterns owing to the positive impact of innovation on both firms’ and workers’ 
productivity. In fact, high-road upgrading inside GVCs can be consistently interpreted as a micro-
view of Hidalgo et al.’s (2007) proposition that economy-wide upgrading requires increased 
diversification and complexity of the mix of goods being produced and exported. As indicated by 
the preceding observations, upgrading via the high-road path is more likely among technology-
intensive and globally-engaged manufacturers. Actually, Usui (2012) argues that this transition 
into high-productivity, high-skills intensive, and sophisticated products was the main driving force 
behind the manufacturing and export success of many East Asian economies in the past two 
decades. However, such transformation also required coordinated investments in physical, 
institutional, and human assets like infrastructure, modern logistics, property rights, and skills 
formation (Hausmann and Klinger 2006). In this light, Pietrobelli and Rabellotti (2011) suggest 
that the institutional backbone should be anchored on a national innovation system that will 
facilitate R&D collaborations and knowledge exchanges between firms, and public and private 
research institutions. In addition, Patalinghug (2003) argues that an effective innovation system 
must have the effort and commitment to introduce new knowledge to both firms and workers. For 
the government, this may require additional reforms in the educational and training system to be 
able to produce a large mass of quality scientists, engineers, and other technical specialists.  
However, one implication of the innovation-led upgrading is that long-term growth at the firm and 
national level will be largely determined by the dynamic relationship between the supply of talents 
and the adequate private sector demand to absorb it. Therefore, the innovation system should be 
synced with industrial and investment policy to ensure that the local supply of high-skilled labor 
attracts new local and foreign jobs in higher value adding activities. In the long run, the goal of a 
coordinated innovation-industry network should be two-pronged: first, graduate high-road firms 
to better GVC functions; and second, help low-road producers develop new competitive 
advantages and link to more sophisticated value chains. In both objectives, equipping the domestic 
workforce with the appropriate skills is an important ingredient for success. 
The economic and social risks of staying on the low-road can have serious long-run consequences. 
Following the argument of Hidalgo et al. (2007), the upgrading trajectory of firms with passive 
efforts to innovate and build new capabilities is headed towards nearby basic and less-
sophisticated goods with similar skills and technological requirements. This implies that 
manufacturers producing unsophisticated goods using unsophisticated capabilities will most likely 
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connect to low-technology value chains (e.g., textiles and food processing rather than complex 
electronics and cars production). Although not impossible, a structural leap into skills- and 
technology-intensive manufacturing and exporting will be difficult without purposeful efforts to 
improve existing capabilities and develop new core competencies; in other words, swerving from 
the low road to the high road will require investments in new technological facilities accompanied 
by more specialized trainings. However, Patalinghug (2003) observes that unlike MNCs, 
Philippine companies only provide the minimum trainings required in order to reduce their 
potential losses in case these workers transfer to new employers. Given the public good nature of 
knowledge and general-purpose skills, firms are often reluctant to invest in people if they cannot 
fully appropriate the returns. This myopic attitude reflects the overall unattractiveness of 
innovative undertakings in the country due to a number of constraints such as limited domestic 
demand, high risks of failure, property rights issues, and better government incentives in non-
R&D activities (Patalinghug 2003). Again, this underlines the importance of a national innovation 
policy that will layout well-coordinated public support for research and training programs in 
strategic sectors. A recent example is the creation of new research facilities, namely the Advanced 
Device and Materials Testing Laboratory and the Electronics Product Development Center, that 
provide state-of-the art laboratories for integrated circuit (IC) design and materials testing (Aldaba 
2015). This was matched by a partnership of TESDA with the electronics sector to keep over 9000 
workers geared up for the industry’s planned expansion to higher-productivity segments. In 
addition, the Department of Science and Technology established the Philippine Institute for 
Integrated Circuits in order to support the advanced training requirements of local companies in 
IC design. Accordingly, the accumulation of highly-specialized skills and the resulting increase in 
labor productivity should encourage firms to provide better compensation packages and reduce 
reliance on contractual employment. 
4. Concluding Remarks 
The general picture emerging from this study is that manufacturers with stronger GVC linkages 
foster better labor conditions. Further, the econometric results confirm that social and economic 
upgrading are often complementary, especially when the former is driven by technological 
innovation. This highlights the potential of GVCs in generating economic and social gains given 
the right preconditions. However, there are some indications that the social benefits of economic 
upgrading may not be evenly distributed. These findings suggest that academic and policy 
discourse should now focus on more important questions. First, what are the major mechanisms 
through which the social gains from GVC upgrading can be maximized? Second, who actually 
benefits from economic upgrading? Lastly, what is the role of policy in promoting an inclusive 
upgrading experience?  
The answer to the first question has been partially explored in this paper where the results highlight 
innovation as an important business and policy tool to create an upgrading process that benefits 
both the firm and its workers. Frederick and Gereffi’s (2016) observation for Philippine E&E firms 
is actually relevant to the entire manufacturing sector: “upgrading requires acquiring new 
technology and knowledge-intensive capabilities and thus represents a more sustainable 
competitive edge than advantages related to low labor costs...” To the extent that moving up the 
value chain requires a non-trivial skills development component, the value added captured by 
labor should generally increase when firms upgrade to more sophisticated process, products, and 
functions. This should also increase their value both as assets of the firm and as productive social 
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actors. However, policy support may be needed to promote an innovative culture in local industries 
especially when firms can easily be tempted to pursue upgrading strategies that do not necessarily 
generate social benefits (e.g., organizational restructuring and functional downgrading to simpler 
but more profitable tasks). Notwithstanding, a more tragic scenario ensues when firms stagnate in 
a particular GVC niche where their contribution to both employment creation and industrial 
growth is compromised. In global production networks where products, technology and skills are 
fast evolving, failure to adapt is always a step back. Some studies suggest that this may be a 
contributing factor to the middle income trap phenomenon since the inability to upgrade at the 
firm level eventually culminates in lackluster growth performance at the aggregate level (Hidalgo 
et al. 2007). This requires further investigation in future studies. 
The second and third questions are concerned with promoting economic upgrading that generates 
more equitable social outcomes. In general, the controversy surrounding the uneven social impact 
of GVC participation reminds us that the efficiency gains from more open trade may come with 
unwanted distributional consequences. Although this is a well-known result in trade theory, the 
manifestations become more concrete in the age of globally-fragmented manufacturing where the 
heterogeneous productivity and costs of labor figure prominently in the allocation of tasks, and 
therefore, welfare. This implies that technological upgrading leading to higher export production 
will expectedly benefit workers in high-skilled intensive GVC activities more than unskilled labor 
in more routine tasks. In addition to this purely economic reason, differential labor conditions 
along the value chain may also influence the inclusiveness of social upgrading. This emphasizes 
the role of labor standards and regulations in GVC stages that are more vulnerable to both 
technological shocks and unacceptable labor practices. However, against the background of 
potentially regressive policies in an already overregulated labor market, the government should 
refocus its efforts towards reforms that bring broad-based improvements in living standards. The 
way forward should be guided by a national and firm-level upgrading strategy where the economic 
and social dimensions are seen as complementary sides of the same objective rather than two 
conflicting end-goals. World Bank (2013) agrees that workers have valid concerns about decent 
wages, good working conditions, and job security. However, instead of creating labor laws that 
seemingly transfer the state’s social protection responsibility to private employers (Lanzona 
2014), government intervention should focus on enabling policies (e.g., reducing cost of doing 
business, infrastructure support, access to finance, and rule of law) that improve the manufacturing 
sector’s coverage and productivity, and therefore, its capability to generate quality employment. 
A closely related policy suggested by the above findings is a holistic upgrading experience through 
a shift in the country’s comparative advantage from cheap labor to highly skilled and productive 
workers. This requires complementing the innovative culture in domestic industries by a stronger 
focus on science and technology education and technical trainings. Towards this end, a well-
coordinated innovation-industry network is necessary to forge strong linkages between the 
business, labor, education, and R&D sectors. This is probably where government intervention is 
more relevant given the public good nature of knowledge produced by research and innovation. 
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